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Abstract 
I argue that the social implications of religious non-affiliation vary across cultural 
contexts, leading to differences across nations in both who is likely to be unaffiliated 
and the religious consequences of such non-affiliation. I test these propositions by 
examining cross-national variation in associations with non-affiliation using mul-
tilevel models and cross-sectional survey data from almost 70,000 respondents in 
52 nations. The results indicate that: 1) both individual characteristics (gender, age, 
and marital status) and nation-level attributes (GDP, communism, and regulation 
of religion) strongly predict religious non-affiliation; 2) differences in non-affilia-
tion by individual-level attributes—women vs. men, old vs. young, and married vs. 
single—are greatest in nations with low levels of religious regulation and high lev-
els of economic development; and 3) the effect of religious non-affiliation on reli-
giosity varies considerably by the political and religious context, and to a lesser ex-
tent by the level of economic development in each nation. These results highlight 
cultural variation in what it means to be religiously unaffiliated. 
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1. Introduction 
A feature article in the April 2016 issue of National Geographic de-
clared in its title: “The World’s Newest Major Religion: No Religion” 
(Bullard, 2016). Growth in religious non-affiliation1 does indeed ap-
pear to be the most profound change in global religiosity in recent de-
cades. As of 2010, there were 1.1 billion people with no religious affil-
iation, accounting for 16% of the world’s population (Hackett et al., 
2012). In the United States alone, the unaffiliated grew from about 
7% of the population at the end of the 1980s to 20% in 2012 (Hout 
and Fischer, 2014). The religiously unaffiliated or “nones” are the sec-
ond largest religious group in 112 countries, or 48% of all nations on 
the Earth (Hackett and Huynh, 2015). Thus far, research on the so-
cial antecedents and religious implications of the growing phenome-
non of non-affiliation has been largely limited to the US population, 
with a few researchers examining other, primarily Western nations 
(e.g. Bowen, 2004; Hayes, 2000; Stark et al., 2005; Voas and Crock-
ett, 2005; Voas and McAndrew, 2012). 
The social significance of religion, however, differs from nation to 
nation (Schwartz, 2007; Weber, 1948). Social acceptance of secularism 
in particular varies geographically (Ribberink et al., 2013). The effects 
of industrialization and modernization on religion differ across na-
tions (Casanova, 1994), producing what Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
(2012: 904) refer to as multiple secularities: “[T]he recognition that 
the notions of the secular, of secularism and secularity are charged 
with highly divergent meanings that are linked to different political 
and cultural contexts and histories of social conflict.” The context-spe-
cific nature of the cultural relevance of non-affiliation suggests that 
the demographic antecedents and religious implications of non-affil-
iation vary across nations. While factors such as gender and age may 
predict non-affiliation in the US (Baker and Smith, 2009; Baker and 
Whitehead, 2016), it is unclear how these associations play out cross-
nationally. Similarly, while the religiously unaffiliated in a few highly 
1 I use the terms unaffiliated, non-affiliated, no religion, and apostate interchangeably 
throughout this article. These terms are intended to convey lack of affiliation with a spe-
cific organized religion, not necessarily lack of religious belief or behavior. Indeed, as the 
text discusses, it is not uncommon for the unaffiliated to hold standard religious beliefs. 
For instance, the results in Table 3 indicate that more than one-half of the unaffiliated be-
lieve in God.  
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developed nations report surprisingly high levels of religiosity (Stark 
et al., 2005), it is unclear how the effects of non-affiliation on religi-
osity differ across populations. 
This article advances understanding of both the social origins and 
religious consequences of religious non-affiliation. I examine cross-
national variation in associations with non-affiliation using multi-
level models and cross-sectional survey data from almost 70,000 re-
spondents in 52 nations. I address two primary research questions. 
First, do the individual-level factors that predict religious non-affili-
ation vary across nations; and if so, what national attributes are as-
sociated with that variation? Specifically, I examine how the effects 
of gender, age, marital status, and education on religious non-affilia-
tion vary by the economic, political, and religious regulation context 
in each nation. Second, do the effects of religious non-affiliation on 
religiosity vary across nations; and if so, what are the factors associ-
ated with that variation? Specifically, I model how the effects of re-
ligious affiliation on religiosity vary by the economic, political, reli-
gious regulation, and religious affiliation context in each nation. The 
results indicate that: 1) both individual and nation-level attributes 
strongly predict religious non-affiliation; 2) differences in non-affil-
iation by individual-level attributes— women vs. men, old vs. young, 
and married vs. single—are greatest in nations with low levels of reli-
gious regulation and high levels of economic development; and 3) the 
effect of religious non-affiliation on religiosity varies considerably by 
the political and religious context, and to a lesser extent by the level 
of economic development in each nation. Ancillary models expand on 
and provide additional nuance to these findings by examining the in-
teraction between communism and state regulation of religion, alter-
native measures of religious regulation, and more specific measures 
of the religious context in each nation. I conclude by discussing cul-
tural variation in what it means to be religiously unaffiliated, and by 
providing suggestions for future research. 
1.1. The social origins of religious non-affiliation 
Just as some demographic groups are relatively likely to be hold re-
ligious beliefs or participate in religious activities, people with cer-
tain attributes are relatively likely to have no religious affiliation. 
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In particular, age, gender, family formation, and education appear 
to be the primary characteristics associated with being religiously 
unaffiliated. “The observation that women are more religious than 
men,” notes Hoffmann (2009: 232), “may be closer to sociology’s ‘one 
law’ than Durkheim’s famous proposition about religious faiths and 
suicide.” Following the general pattern of higher female religiosity, 
women are less likely than men to be unaffiliated (Baker and Smith, 
2009). The strong, positive association between age and religion is an-
other well-established social fact (Wink and Dillon, 2002). Thus, age 
should negatively affect non-affiliation (Schwadel, 2010). As Heaton 
and Goodman (1985:343) conclude, “Perhaps no other social institu-
tion has a closer link with religion than does the family.” Indeed, mar-
riage is seen as a key factor protecting against apostasy (Baker and 
Smith, 2015). Finally, higher education may “erode” religion (John-
son, 1997). Consequently, education is assumed to have a positive as-
sociation with various forms of secularity (Baker and Smith, 2015). 
I expect the relationships between these individual-level character-
istics and religious non-affiliation to vary across nations. The social 
and cultural implications of gender (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), age 
(Ayalon et al., 2014), marital status (Cooke and Baxter, 2010), and ed-
ucation (Schwadel, 2015) differ across nations. What it means to be 
old or young, a man or woman, college or not college educated, and 
married or single are context specific. These are socially constructed 
identities that are influenced by local cultures (Jenkins, 2008). Con-
sequently, the impact of these demographic factors on the decision to 
not affiliate with organized religion is likely to be influenced by the 
national context. I draw on theories of modernization and economic 
development, conformity in highly regulated societies, and the impact 
of political systems to develop hypotheses regarding the nation-level 
attributes that moderate the effects of individual-level characteristics 
on religious non-affiliation. 
I focus on three nation-level factors that may be related to varia-
tion in the association between individual-level attributes and reli-
gious non-affiliation. First, economic development, and modernity 
more broadly, affect social relations and norms in various ways (in-
cluding religious behaviors, which I take up in more detail in the next 
section). The social and cultural significance of demographic attri-
butes in particular appears to be tied to economic development. For 
instance, gender roles vary by the level of economic development in a 
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nation (Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Economic 
development is associated with reductions in the disparity between 
men’s and women’s roles in societies, which suggests that the effect 
of gender on religious non-affiliation should be reduced in highly de-
veloped nations. The effects of other demographic attributes on reli-
gious non-affiliation may similarly be attenuated in more prosperous 
nations. How we view the elderly, for example, varies across nations, 
apparently in tandem with economic development (Sokolovsky, 2009). 
The social structures and institutions of more developed nations pro-
vide stability in expectations that lead to enduring influences of early 
life experiences (Dannefer, 2003), thereby potentially diminishing the 
effects of age on attributes such as religious non-affiliation. Social 
change research suggests a similar pattern with education, where 
the association between education and apostasy declined in both the 
US (Schwadel, 2014) and Great Britain (Voas and McAndrew, 2012) 
as those nations became some of the most developed nations in the 
world. The first hypothesis reflects this potential impact of economic 
development: The effects of demographic attributes on religious non-
affiliation will be minimized in nations with higher per capita GDP. 
The second relevant nation-level attribute is religious regulation, 
which generally pertains to laws and institutions that favor one reli-
gion over others (Grim and Finke, 2006). The regulation of religion 
appears to have a robust influence on many religious beliefs and be-
haviors (McCleary and Barro, 2006; Ruiter and Tubergen, 2009), 
including religious non-affiliation (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004). In 
most societies, being religiously unaffiliated is an innovative and even 
deviant identity, which, as Tamney and colleagues (1989: 216) note, 
“may evoke some negative sanctions.” The sanctions resulting from 
non-affiliation, however, are qualitatively different in societies with 
high levels of religious regulation. In such societies one does not only 
risk existential existence or potentially social isolation by choosing 
non-affiliation (Edgell et al., 2017); one also risks being exposed to 
legal sanctions and, in some cases, imprisonment or even death for 
religious non-conformity (Fox, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2017). 
Legal regulations promote conformity and reduce deviation from es-
tablished norms (Blanton and Hall, 2009). Therefore, the second hy-
pothesis is as follows: The effects of demographic attributes on reli-
gious non-affiliation will be minimized in nations with high levels of 
religious regulation. 
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Third, the political context influences religious affiliation and, po-
tentially, the association between education and religious nonaffili-
ation. There are relatively low levels of religiosity, and high levels of 
non-affiliation, in communist and formerly communist nations (Fox 
and Tabory, 2008; Froese, 2004). Communist regimes are generally 
antagonistic toward religion; and this antagonism is often inculcated 
through state institutions such as schools (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 
2001). Consequently, greater exposure to educational institutions in 
communist and post-communist states may promote secularism. The 
third hypothesis is thus: The positive effect of higher levels of educa-
tion on religious non-affiliation will be larger in communist and for-
merly communist nations. In sum, the first goal of this article is to test 
how nation-level factors moderate the effects of individual-level, de-
mographic attributes on religious nonaffiliation. 
1.2. The religious consequences of non-affiliation 
Turning to the consequences of religious non-affiliation, the second 
goal of this article is to assess how nation-level factors moderate the 
effects of non-affiliation on religiosity. Research in a few highly devel-
oped nations suggests that being religiously unaffiliated is not equiv-
alent to being irreligious (e.g. Lim et al., 2010; Stark et al., 2005). For 
instance, more than one-half of unaffiliated Americans are deists or 
theists (Kosmin et al., 2009). As Hout and Fischer (2002: 175) con-
clude, “Few people with no religious preference showed any sign of 
religious activity …. But they do pray.” In addition to highlighting the 
potential religiosity of the unaffiliated, this quote points to an impor-
tant caveat: Although the religiously unaffiliated are on average less 
religious than those affiliated with organized religion, this difference 
in religiosity varies across domains of religiosity. It is therefore im-
portant to examine various forms of religiosity. 
Just as I argued that the effects of demographic characteristics 
on religious non-affiliation vary across nations, I expect the associ-
ation between non-affiliation and religiosity to vary across nations. 
As discussed above, what it means to be religiously unaffiliated dif-
fers across nations (Ribberink et al., 2013). There are “multiple sec-
ularities,” which are tied to their local cultures (Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Burchardt, 2012). The rapid growth of non-affiliation in the US, for 
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example, appears to be partially motivated by political circumstances 
rather than a decline in religion, leading to large numbers of unaf-
filiated Americans who hold conventional religious beliefs (Hout and 
Fischer, 2014; Putnam and Campbell, 2010). In general, the form and 
progress of secularization is dependent on the historic and geographic 
context (Gorski, 2000; Martin, 1978), suggesting that the religious im-
plications of nonaffiliation vary across nations. I draw from several 
theoretical perspectives—including secularization and modernization 
theories, supply-side views of religiosity, and social psychological per-
spectives on group norms—to develop hypotheses regarding the na-
tion-level attributes that moderate the effects of non-affiliation on re-
ligiosity. In addition to the three nation-level factors discussed in the 
previous section—economic development, religious regulation, and 
communism—I also generate expectations about the influence of the 
religious context in each nation. 
Secularization and modernization theories emphasize the detri-
mental influence of economic development on traditional forms of re-
ligiosity. This is perhaps most notably articulated by Norris and In-
glehart (2004), who argue that the existential security provided by 
economic prosperity reduces the need for religion by diminishing the 
uncertainty of daily life. With some caveats, empirical research gen-
erally supports this proposition. The social importance of religion, for 
example, varies with the level of economic development (Bettendorf 
and Dijkgraaf, 2008). It is more acceptable to eschew religious beliefs 
and behaviors in more developed nations (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; 
Taylor, 2007). Consequently, the unaffiliated may feel freer to exhibit 
additional signs of secularity in such contexts. The fourth hypothesis 
is thus: Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffili-
ated are larger in nations with high per capita GDP. 
In contrast to economic prosperity, religious regulation may be as-
sociated with fewer differences in religiosity between the affiliated 
and unaffiliated. The potential consequences of religious behaviors—or 
lack thereof—are greater where there is more government regulation 
of religion (Grim and Finke, 2006). Sanctions inhibit non-conformity 
(Blanton and Hall, 2009), which may lead the religiously affiliated 
and unaffiliated behave more similarly to one another. Additionally, 
the religious economies or supply-side perspective on religious vital-
ity suggests that the regulation of religion diminishes religiosity in the 
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population more broadly (Stark and Finke, 2000). While most peo-
ple in a nation with high levels of religious regulation may be affili-
ated with a religion (or “the religion”), the supply-side argument is 
that affiliation in such societies is nominal in nature. Consequently, 
there should be relatively little difference in religiosity between the 
affiliated and unaffiliated in those nations. Thus, the fifth hypothesis: 
Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated will be 
minimized in nations with high levels of religious regulation. 
The religious context may also play a role. The prevalence of reli-
gious non-affiliation varies dramatically across nations (Hackett and 
Huynh, 2015; Warf, 2015). The unaffiliated should behave differently 
when they constitute a larger proportion of a nation. Popular culture 
is tied to the religious character of a nation (Friedland, 2001) and will 
thus convey different messages about the importance of religiosity de-
pending on the prevalence of non-affiliation. This expectation has a 
firm grounding in social psychological perspectives, which emphasize 
the importance of the social context in conditioning social expecta-
tions. Mead’s (1934) conception of the generalized other is particularly 
relevant, as the generalized other takes on different characteristics 
in nations with high levels of non-affiliation. Social structure—in this 
case the prevalence of non-affiliation—influences behavioral expecta-
tions (McLeod and Lively, 2003), such as expectations regarding re-
ligious beliefs and behaviors (Weber, 1948). Consequently, the sixth 
hypothesis: Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffil-
iated are larger in nations with high levels of religious non-affiliation. 
Finally, the political context should affect the association between 
non-affiliation and religiosity. As noted above, non-affiliation is more 
normative in communist and post-communist nations (Fox and Tabory, 
2008; Froese, 2004). Lack of religious belief and participation are not 
only socially acceptable but even state-sanctioned in many commu-
nist and formerly communist nations (Barber, 2011; Barro and Mc-
Cleary, 2003). Unlike the predominant form of religious regulation, 
which favors one religion over others (Grim and Finke, 2006), com-
munist states generally favor secularity. Similar to the proposed ef-
fect of large numbers of religious nonaffiliates, the sanctioning of sec-
ularity in communist nations may strengthen the connection between 
non-affiliation and low levels of religiosity. Thus, the seventh hypoth-
esis is as follows: Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and 
unaffiliated are larger in communist and post-communist nations. In 
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sum, the analyses below further understanding of religious non-affil-
iation by examining nation-level factors that moderate both the de-
mographic characteristics that predict non-affiliation and the effects 
of religious affiliation on religiosity. 
1.3. Data 
I use data from the most recent World Values Survey (WVS 6), which 
was administered between 2010 and 2014. WVS 6 includes survey data 
from more than 86,000 respondents in 60 nations. Both full proba-
bility and quota sampling procedures were used to reach the goal of 
surveying at least 1,000 respondents age 18 or older in each nation. 
The surveys were primarily administered face-to-face. Religious af-
filiation and/or religiosity questions were not included on surveys in 
eight nations.2 After deleting those eight nations, and deleting indi-
vidual cases with missing data on the dependent variables, there are 
70,340 respondents in 52 nations. Another 929 cases are deleted due 
to missing data on other variables in the models, resulting in an ana-
lytic sample of 69,414. The dependent variables gauge non-affiliation 
and religiosity. A dummy variable indicates religious non-affiliation. 
The WVS includes four broadly-applicable measures of religiosity. Re-
ligious service attendance is a seven-category measure ranging from 
never/practically never to more than once a week. Frequency of prayer 
is an eight-category variable ranging from never/practically never to 
several times a day. Service attendance and prayer are standardized 
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Dummy vari-
ables indicate belief in God and considering one’s self religious. De-
scriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1. 
The models include several individual-level independent variables. 
Dummy variables indicate married and female respondents. Ideally, 
the models would also include a measure of having children. As Baker 
and Smith (2015: 152) note, “What often reverses apostasy are mar-
riage and having children.” Unfortunately, there is considerable miss-
ing data on the survey question about having children, including an 
entire country that did not get the question. Consequently, having chil-
dren is not included in the models, though the results reported here 
2 The eight deleted nations are Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Yemen. 
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are similar when having children is included in the models.3 Age is 
coded in years of age. Age-squared is included in the models when sta-
tistically significant (p < .05) to compensate for nonlinear age effects. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
  Mean (Percent)  Standard Deviation
LEVEL-1 (INDIVIDUAL)
No Religious Affiliation  (19.5%)
Christian  (46.9%)
Muslim  (23.1%)
Other Religion  (10.4%)
Religious Service Attendance  .000  1.000
Frequency of Prayer  .000  1.000
Believe in God  (84.7%)
Consider Self Religious  (67.3%)
Agea  42.465  16.703
Married  (55.2%)
Female  (52.9%)
Education:
 No Secondary School Degree  (35.8%)
 Secondary-Vocational  (20.2%)
 Secondary-University Prep  (18.0%)
 Some College  (7.9%)
 College Degree  (18.1%)
LEVEL-2 (NATION)
Communist/Former Communist  (26.9%)
GRI  3.567  3.115
GDP  16.387  17.010
Proportion No Religious Affiliation  .189  .209
Level-2 Variables in Ancillary Models:
 Established/Favored Religion  (30.8%)
 No State Religion  (59.6%)
 State Hostile to Religion  (9.6%)
 Proportion Christian  .474  .341
 Proportion Muslim  .234  .372
 Proportion Other Religion  .102  .199
Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52.
a. Age is centered so it has a mean of zero, and age-squared is added to the models when 
significant (p < .05).
3 The results are similar when the models of non-affiliation include a dummy variable that 
indicates having children (not shown). Specifically, the effects of age, gender, marriage, 
and education are substantively unchanged (both overall effects and variation across na-
tions), and there is a significant, negative effect of children (considerably smaller than the 
effects of gender and marriage) that does not vary significantly across nations. 
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Education is measured with dummy variables for those who completed 
secondary technical/vocational school, secondary university prepara-
tory school, some university education, and a university degree. Not 
completing secondary school is the omitted reference category. Mod-
els of religiosity include dummy variables for Christian, Muslim, and 
other religion respondents, with the unaffiliated as the omitted refer-
ence category. This modeling strategy accounts for differences in re-
ligiosity between affiliates of different religions (Halman and Drau-
lans, 2006). 
There are several nation-level independent variables included in the 
models. Regulation of religion is assessed with the Government Regu-
lation Index (GRI), which measures “restrictions placed on the prac-
tice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies, 
or administrative actions of the state” (Grim and Finke, 2006: 7). Eco-
nomic prosperity is assessed with the 2012 per capita Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP), derived from the International Monetary Fund and 
reported in US dollars (divided by 1,000 to produce more comparable 
coefficients). A dummy variable indicates communist and formerly 
communist nations (see La Porta et al., 1998). Finally, the proportion 
of the nation reporting no religious affiliation is included as an inde-
pendent variable in the models of religiosity. Ancillary models replace 
the GRI measure of religious regulation with dummy variables for na-
tions with established or favored religions and nations that are hostile 
toward religion, with the large category of nations with no state reli-
gion serving as the omitted reference category (Pew Research Center, 
2017). The Ancillary models also examine the influence of proportion 
Christian, Muslim, and other religion in each nation, rather than the 
proportion unaffiliated. 
1.4. Analysis technique 
I use two-level multilevel models with individuals nested in nations to 
gauge 1) the effects of independent variables on religious non-affilia-
tion and 2) the effects of religious non-affiliation on religiosity. These 
models adjust for lack of independence between individuals and the 
nations they live in with separate level-1 (individual) and level-2 (na-
tion) error terms (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The level-1 model for 
non-affiliation, for example, is as follows:  
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Logit (Religious Non-Affiliation)ij =  β0 
+ β1 Femaleij 
+ β2 Marriedij 
+ β3 Technical Secondary Degreeij 
+ β4 Preparatory Secondary Degreeij 
+ β5 Some Collegeij 
+ β6 College Degreeij 
+ β7 Ageij 
+ β8 Ageij2 
+ rij   
where the log odds of non-affiliation for person i in nation j is re-
gressed on education, gender, marital status, and age, with the er-
ror term or variance component r. The level-2 model of non-affilia-
tion is as follows: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01Communistj + γ02GDPj + γ03GRIj + u0j
where γ00 is the logged overall mean of non-affiliation, γ01 through γ03 
are the coefficients for nation-level variables, and u0j represents the 
error or unexplained variation specific to nation j. 
An important advantage to multilevel models is the ability to in-
clude random slopes, which are used here to assess variation in the 
effects of independent variables on non-affiliation and variation in 
the effect of non-affiliation on religiosity. Cross-level interactions be-
tween level-1 and level-2 variables are key to gauging how the effects 
of individual attributes on non-affiliation vary by nation-level char-
acteristics, and how the effect of non-affiliation on religiosity varies 
by nation-level characteristics. For instance, the cross-level interac-
tions and random slope for gender in the model of non-affiliation are 
as follows: 
β1Femaleij = γ10 + γ11Communistj + γ12GDPj + γ13GRIj + u1j
where u1j is variation in the slope of gender specific to nation j, and 
γ11, γ12, and γ13 are the interaction terms. 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I present results from 
binary logistic multilevel models of religious non-affiliation, focusing 
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on variation in the effects of age, gender, marital status, and education 
across nations. Second, I present results from multilevel models of the 
four measures of religiosity, focusing on variation in the effects of re-
ligious affiliation across nations. Third, I present results from ancil-
lary analyses that examine the interaction between communism and 
state regulation of religion, alternative measures of religious regula-
tion, and the influence of more specific measures of the religious con-
text in each nation. The models are weighted and conducted in HLM 
7. All variables other than the focal level-1 variables with random 
slopes are centered on the overall or grand mean. Several figures high-
light the important findings. Only statistically significant coefficients 
(p < .05) are used in calculations to produce the figures. 
2. Results 
2.1. The effects of individual-level characteristics on religious  
non-affiliation 
Results from multilevel models of religious non-affiliation are re-
ported in Table 2. Model 2-A shows that age (b = –.048, and age-
squared b = –.008), gender (b = –.198), and marital status (b = –.139) 
each have strong, negative effects on the likelihood of reporting no re-
ligious affiliation. Women’s odds of non-affiliation, for example, are 
(℮–.198 = .820, 0.820 – 1 = ) 18% lower than men’s odds of non-af-
filiation. At level-2, communism (b = .901) and GDP (b = .026) are 
positively associated with non-affiliation while religious regulation 
(GRI) has a negative effect (b = –.201). The variance components 
show that the effects of all the independent variables except for age-
squared vary significantly across nations.4 For instance, in the 47 out 
of 52 nations where married has a significant (p < .05) negative ef-
fect, marriage is associated with between an 8% and 45% decrease 
in the odds of non-affiliation (nation-specific odds ratios not shown, 
available on request). Moreover, marriage has a significant, positive 
effect on non-affiliation in three nations. The nation-specific effects 
4 There are too few degrees of freedom to include random slopes for all independent vari-
ables. Alternative models (not shown) indicate that variation in the effect of age-squared 
has no substantive impact on the results. 
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Table 2. Binary logistic multilevel models of religious non-affiliation.
Fixed effects                                                                         Model 2-A                               Model 2-B
   b                    se  b                 se
Intercept  −1.078  .106***  −1.081  .099***
Level-1 (Individual)
 Agea  –.048  .011***  –.050  .009***
  × (Former) Communist    .002  .001
  × GRIb    .089  .027**
  × GDPb    –.015  .008*
 Age-Squaredb  –.008  .004*  –.007  .004*
 Married  –.139  .027***  –.139  .022***
  × (Former) Communist    –.109  .060
  × GRI    .030  .009**
  × GDP    –.002  .001
 Female  –.198  .027***  –.198  .026***
  × (Former) Communist    –.101  .066
  × GRI    .023  .008**
  × GDP    –.000  .002
 Education:
  Secondary-Vocational  .049  .030  .052  .030
  × (Former) Communist    .023  .059
  × GRI    .002  .008
  × GDP    .001  .003
  Secondary-University Prep  .029  .034  .025  .032
  × (Former) Communist    .199  .084*
  × GRI    –.010  .011
  × GDP  .001  .003
 Some College  .005  .046  .017  .045
  × (Former) Communist    .146  .124
  × GRI    –.024  .014
  × GDP    .001  .004
 College Degree  .070 .044  .062  .042
  × (Former) Communist    .164  .142
  × GRI    –.005  .016
  × GDP    .001  .003
Level-2 (Nation)
 (Former) Communist  .901 .401*  .509  .300
 GRI  –.201  .053***  –.104  .045*
 GDP  .026  .005***  .027  .005***
Random effects                                                  Variance Component                  Variance Component
 Intercept  3.112***   2.784***
 Agea  .011***   .008***
 Married  .050***   .050***
 Female  .091***   .075***
 Secondary-Vocational  .111***   .103***
 Secondary-University Prep  .147***   .111***
 Some College  .281***   .218***
 College Degree  .241***   .235***
AIC   186707   187510
Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 10, variance component multiplied by 100.
b. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100.
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shed light on why college graduation does not have the expected pos-
itive association with non-affiliation at the aggregate. College grad-
uation does indeed have a significant, positive effect on non-affilia-
tion in 30 nations, but it also has a significant, negative effect in 12 
nations, and no effect in 10 other nations. This finding comports with 
both research showing changes in the effects of education on religion 
within nations (e.g. Schwadel, 2014; Voas and McAndrew, 2012) and 
research showing cross-national variation in the effects of education 
on religion (e.g. Hayes, 2000; Schwadel, 2015). Overall, the results 
from Model 2-A point to considerable variability in the demographic 
composition of non-affiliation around the globe. 
Model 2-B includes cross-level interactions. The AIC increases from 
Model 2-A to 2-B, indicating worse model fit, which is not surprising 
given the number of insignificant interactions in Model 2-B. Nonethe-
less, the variance component for the intercept is reduced in Model 2-B, 
which indicates that a notable proportion of the between-nation vari-
ance has been explained with the addition of interactions to the model. 
There are significant interactions between GRI and age, marital status, 
and gender; between GDP and age; and between university prep second-
ary school degree and communist. The significant interactions with GRI 
are depicted in Fig. 1, which shows the effects of gender, marital sta-
tus, and age for those in nations with the no religious regulation (eight 
nations have a GRI of 0), nations at the mean of GRI, and nations one 
standard deviation above the mean of GRI. As Fig. 1a shows, women 
(probability of 0.23) are less likely than men (probability of 0.28) to 
report no religious affiliation in nations with no religious regulation. 
In high-GRI nations, there are lower levels of non-affiliation for both 
men and women, but almost no difference between men (probability of 
0.16) and women (probability of 0.15). Fig. 1b shows a similar pattern 
for marital status, where the difference in the probability of non-affili-
ation between the married (less than 0.24) and unmarried (more than 
0.27) in nations with no religious regulation is nonexistent in high-GRI 
nations. Fig. 1c shows that there is a robust, negative effect of age in 
nations with low levels of religious regulation but not in nations with 
high levels of religious regulation. For instance, the difference in prob-
ability of nonaffiliation between the oldest and youngest respondents 
is 0.12 in nations with no government regulation of religion and only 
0.02 in nations one standard deviation above the mean of GRI. Overall, 
these results indicate that the effects of age, gender, and marital status 
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are amplified in nations with little or no government regulation of re-
ligion, and minimized in nations with high levels of government regu-
lation, which supports Hypotheses 2. 
Fig. 1. Variation in individual-level predictors of religious non-affiliation by GRI. 
P h i l i p  S c h wa d e l  i n  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  R e s e a r c h  70  ( 2 0 1 8 )       17
Model 2-B additionally shows that the effect of age varies by GDP. 
This interaction is depicted in Fig. 2, which shows that the negative 
effect of age is far more robust in nations with a high GDP. This is 
in contrast to Hypothesis 1, which suggests that the effects of demo-
graphic attributes on non-affiliation are instead reduced in high GDP 
nations. The difference in the probability of nonaffiliation between 
the oldest and youngest respondents is almost 0.19 in a nation one 
standard deviation above the mean of GDP and only 0.07 in a nation 
at the 20th percentile of GDP. 
The only significant interaction with education indicates that there 
is no difference in non-affiliation between those with a secondary prep 
school degree and those with no secondary school degree in non-com-
munist nations, but in communist and formerly communist nations 
a secondary prep school degree is associated with 0.03 greater prob-
ability of non-affiliation (not shown in figure). This may reflect in-
doctrination into communist governments’ opposition to religion in 
some secondary schools (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001), and provides 
some support for Hypothesis 3. Overall, the results in Table 2 reveal 
extensive differences across nations in the effects of individual-level 
factors on religious non-affiliation. Who is and is not likely to be re-
ligiously unaffiliated is indeed context specific, varying considerably 
by the level of religious regulation and to a lesser extent by commu-
nism and the level of economic development. Next, I examine varia-
tion in the implications of non-affiliation. 
Fig. 2. Variation in effect of age on religious non-affiliation by GDP. 
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2.2. The effects of religious non-affiliation on religiosity 
Results from models of religiosity are reported in Table 3. The effects 
of Christian, Muslim, and other religion are robust and positive across 
all four indicators of religiosity. Not surprisingly, the unaffiliated are 
the least religious. The variance components, however, show that the 
effects of religious affiliation vary across nations. For instance, al-
though Christian has a significant (p < .05), positive effect on ser-
vice attendance in each nation, the nation-specific coefficients vary 
between 0.171 and 1.84 (not shown). The intercepts reflect religiosity 
Table 3. Multilevel models of religiosity without interactions.
Fixed effects                     Service Attendance          Frequency of Prayer         Believe in Goda            Consider Self Religiousa
 b se b se b se b se
Intercept –.774 .058** –.682 .083 .064 .139*** –.744 .134***
Level-1 (Individual)
Christian .996 .058*** .832 .077*** 1.654 .159*** 1.766 .134***
Muslim .923 .071*** .961 .085*** 2.210 .159*** 2.130 .163***
Other Religion .877 .072*** .737 .080*** 1.248 .139*** 1.680 .157***
  Age .003 .001*** .005 .001*** .002 .001 .009 .001***
  Married .062 .014*** .022 .011 .044 .022* .113 .021***
  Female –.017 .050 .170 .021*** .298 .028*** .288 .028***
  Education:
    Secondary-Vocational .014 .013 –.010 .015 –.039 .025 –.050 .032
    Secondary-University Prep .002 .017 –.005 .018 –.054 .026* –.097 .038**
    Some College .058 .015*** .021 .018 –.093 .037* –.092 .039*
    College Degree .026 .020 .004 .022 –.127 .049** –.124 .049*
Level-2 (Nation)
  (Former) Communist –.604 .093*** –.809 .109*** −1.075 .227*** –.081 .226
  GRI –.013 .018 –.009 .018 –.034 .029 –.086 .030**
  GDP –.013 .004*** –.015 .003*** –.029 .007*** –.021 .005***
  Proportion Unaffiliated –.014 .181 –.149 .276 −1.510 .429*** –.189 .479
Random effects                       Variance Comp              Variance Comp            Variance Comp                 Variance Comp
Intercept .133***  .211***  1.374***  1.835***
Christian .139***  .197***  1.836***  1.901***
Muslim .169***  .236***  1.361***  2.130***
Other Religion .181***  .259***  .976***  1.747***
Level-1 (Individual) .591  .490  –  –
AIC 161117  148087  190565  196152
Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
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among the unaffiliated because religious affiliation measures are not 
centered. Significant, negative intercepts in three out of four models 
in Table 3 indicate low levels of religiosity among the unaffiliated. The 
positive intercept in the model of belief in God means the unaffiliated 
are more likely than not to believe in God (i.e. probability over 0.5). 
Still, the negative effect of proportion unaffiliated (b = –1.510) in that 
model points to relatively low levels of belief in God in nations where 
a large proportion of the population is unaffiliated. Other level-2 vari-
ables show that living in a communist or formerly communist nation 
has a negative effect on prayer (b = –.809), attendance (b = –.604), 
and belief in God (b = –1.075), and religious regulation has a negative 
effect on considering one’s self religious (b = –.086). In line with re-
search on religion, economic development, and modernization more 
broadly (e.g. Norris and Inglehart, 2004), GDP has a strong, negative 
effect on all four measures of religiosity. 
The multilevel models of religiosity in Table 4 introduce cross-level 
interactions between religious affiliations and nation-level charac-
teristics. The addition of interactions leads to a reduction in AIC, and 
therefore improved model fit, in all the models except for the model 
of service attendance (though only minimally in the model of prayer). 
The most consistent finding across the models is the positive inter-
action between religious affiliations—particularly Christian (three of 
four models) and Muslim (all four models)—and proportion unaffil-
iated. These interactions, which are depicted in Fig. 3, indicate that 
differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated are 
greater in nations with large unaffiliated populations. For instance, as 
Fig. 3a shows, the difference in service attendance between the unaf-
filiated and Muslims grows as the proportion unaffiliated increases. 
Estimated difference in attendance between Muslims and the unaffil-
iated is 0.89 in a nation with only 1% unaffiliated and 1.30 in a nation 
one standard deviation above the mean of proportion unaffiliated. Fig. 
3b shows that differences in frequency of prayer between the unaffili-
ated and both Muslims and Christians grow as the proportion unaffil-
iated increases. For instance, estimated difference in prayer between 
Christians and the unaffiliated is 0.47 in a nation with 1% unaffili-
ated and 0.74 in a nation one standard deviation above the mean of 
proportion unaffiliated. Fig. 3c shows that differences in belief in God 
between the unaffiliated and affiliates of all three religious traditions 
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Table 4. Multilevel models of religiosity with cross-level interactions.
Fixed effects                        Service Attendance           Frequency of Prayer           Believe in Goda         Consider Self Religiousa
 b se b se b se b se
Intercept –.762 .062*** –.651 .071*** .767 .139*** –.624 .122***
Level-1 (Individual)
Christian .985 .063*** .800 .066*** 1.544 .154*** 1.634 .126***
  × (Former) Communist –.021 .180 .179 .210 1.331 .396** 1.326 .381***
  × GRI .005 .031 .019 .033 .002 .061 –.063 .066
  × GDP –.001 .005 .006 .005 .020 .009* .008 .010
  × Proportion Unaffiliated .373 .337 .694 .331* 1.650 .566** 1.959 .822*
Muslim .936 .068*** .934 .074*** 2.092 .145*** 2.017 .143***
  × (Former) Communist –.265 .153 –.088 .185 .772 .365* .693 .389
  × GRI –.002 .027 .018 .029 .017 .048 –.010 .057
  × GDP –.004 .005 .005 .005 .021 .006*** .011 .008
  × Proportion Unaffiliated 1.047 .380** .829 .388* 1.901 .579** 2.133 .901*
Other Religion .853 .071*** .713 .084*** 1.194 .114*** 1.602 .132***
  × (Former) Communist –.270 .190 .547 .241* 1.472 .289*** 1.794 .336***
  × GRI .026 .023 –.049 .035 .006 .043 –.084 .056
  × GDP –.001 .004 .009 .005 .017 .008* .016 .009
  × Proportion Unaffiliated .215 .281 –.196 .346 1.030 .458* 1.002 .659
Age .003 .001*** .005 .001*** .002 .001 .010 .001***
Married .062 .014*** .022 .011 .044 .023 .117 .021***
Female –.017 .050 .170 .021*** .307 .029*** .299 .029***
Education:
  Secondary-Vocational .014 .013 –.010 .015 –.039 .025 –.051 .033
  Secondary-University Prep .002 .017 –.005 .018 –.054 .027* –.100 .039**
  Some College .058 .015*** .021 .018 –.094 .038* –.093 .040*
  College Degree .026 .020 .004 .022 –.130 .050** –.129 .051*
Level-2 (Nation)
(Former) Communist –.506 .132*** –.851 .169*** −1.567 .337*** −1.158 .305***
GRI –.007 .019 –.025 .024 –.005 .050 –.031 .045
GDP –.012 .004** –.019 .004*** –.036 .007*** –.031 .007***
Proportion Unaffiliated –.348 .183 –.758 .278** −2.052 .601*** −1.456 .451**
Random effects                       Variance Comp.               Variance Comp.             Variance Comp.               Variance Comp.
Intercept .123***  .181***  1.334***  1.319***
Christian .135***  .153***  1.552***  1.420***
Muslim .132***  .188***  1.183***  1.489***
Other Religion .152***  .222***  .810***  1.014***
Level-1 (Individual) .591  .490  –  –
AIC 161128  148086  190091  196131
Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
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Fig. 3. Variation 
in effects of 
religious affiliation 
on religiosity 
by presence of 
unaffiliated in 
nation. 
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increase as the percent with no affiliation in the nation increases. In a 
nation with 1% unaffiliated, the probability of belief in God is 0.85 for 
Christians, 0.91 for Muslims, and 0.76 for both affiliates of other re-
ligions and the unaffiliated. In a nation one standard deviation above 
the mean of proportion unaffiliated, the probability of belief in God is 
0.83 for Christians, 0.90 for Muslims, 0.68 for affiliates of other reli-
gions, and less than 0.59 for the unaffiliated. Fig. 3d shows substan-
tial growth in differences in considering one’s self religious between 
the unaffiliated and both Christians and Muslims as the proportion 
unaffiliated in a nation increases. Although Christians’ and Muslims’ 
likelihood considering themselves religious increases moderately as 
the proportion unaffiliated increases, the probability of considering 
one’s self religious for the unaffiliated declines from 0.44 in a nation 
with 1% unaffiliated to 0.31 in a nation one standard deviation above 
the mean of unaffiliated. Another way to view these results is that that 
non-affiliates’ religiosity (all measures but attendance) is considerably 
lower in nations where non-affiliation is more common but the reli-
giosity of religious affiliates—particularly Christians and Muslims—
is not diminished by the prevalence of non-affiliation in the nation. 
These findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 6. 
There are significant interactions between religious affiliations and 
living in a communist or formerly communist nation in three of the 
four models of religiosity in Table 4. These interactions are depicted 
in Fig. 4. Fig. 4a shows that the difference in prayer between the un-
affiliated and affiliates of other religions is larger in communist and 
formerly communist nations (1.18) than in noncommunist nations 
(0.63). As Fig. 4b shows, differences in belief in God between the un-
affiliated and affiliates of all three religious traditions are far more 
robust in communist and formerly communist nations. In non-com-
munist nations, probability of belief in God is 0.85 for Christians, 0.91 
for Muslims, and 0.77 for both the unaffiliated and affiliates of other 
religions. In communist and formerly communist nations, probabil-
ity of belief in God is 0.82 for Christians and Muslims, 0.75 for affil-
iates of other religions, and 0.41 for the unaffiliated. Fig. 4c reveals 
a similar pattern with considering one’s self religious, though com-
munism only moderates the effects of Christian and other religion, 
not Muslim. On the whole, the results in Fig. 4 highlight the robust, 
negative effects of communism on the religiosity of the unaffiliated 
in particular, which leads to larger differences in religiosity between 
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the affiliated and unaffiliated in communist and formerly communist 
nations. These findings support Hypothesis 7. 
Fig. 4. Variation in effects of religious affiliation on religiosity by communism. 
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Finally, there are significant interactions between each religious 
affiliation and GDP in the model of belief in God in Table 4. As Fig. 5 
shows, GDP is associated with a large decline in belief in God among 
the unaffiliated, and far more moderate declines among the religiously 
affiliated. Consequently, there are particularly large differences in be-
lief in God between the affiliated and unaffiliated in nations with high 
per capita GDP, which provides some support for Hypothesis 4. For in-
stance, in a nation at the 20th percentile of GDP, probability of belief 
in God is 0.87 for Christians, 0.91 for Muslims, and 0.79 for affiliates 
of other religions and the unaffiliated. In a nation one standard devi-
ation above the mean of GDP, probability of belief in God is 0.80 for 
Christians, 0.88 for Muslims, 0.67 for affiliates of other religions, and 
0.54 for the unaffiliated. There are no significant interactions between 
religious affiliations and GRI, thus providing no support for Hypothe-
sis 5. In general, the results in Table 4 indicate that differences in re-
ligiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated are greatest in com-
munist and formerly communist nations, high per capita GDP nations, 
and nations with large unaffiliated populations. 
2.3. Ancillary models 
Extant theoretical and empirical research suggests several alterna-
tive model specifications that I address in this final results section. 
First, as the discussion of communism above indicates, the effects of 
Fig. 5. Variation in effects of religious affiliation on belief in god by GDP. 
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communism are expected to derive from antagonism toward religion 
commonly found in communist and post-communist governments. 
Consequently, the effects of communism may be tied to the level of 
religious regulation in the nation. I address this possibility with mod-
els that include interactions between GRI and communism. Models of 
non-affiliation reveal no significant two-way interactions between GRI 
and communism, nor three-way interactions between GRI, commu-
nism, and level-1 demographic attributes (not shown). When it comes 
to models of religiosity, however, there are some notable interactions 
between GRI and communism. 
As the results in Table 5 show, there is a significant, positive inter-
action between communism and GRI in the models of service atten-
dance and belief in God (Models 5-A), which means the negative ef-
fect of communism on both those measures of religiosity is reduced 
in nations with high levels of religious regulation. This is somewhat 
Table 5. Focal fixed effects results from multilevel models of religiosity with interactions between 
communism and GRI.
                                            Service Attendance        Frequency of Prayer            Believe in Goda          Consider Self Religiousa
 b se b se b se b se
MODELS 5-A
(Former) Communist –.736 .240** −1.533 .541** −1.890 .266*** .173 .246
GRI .016 .049 .016 .053 –.108 .036** –.070 .041
(Former) Communist × GRI .127 .051* –.127 .098 .182 .054*** –.049 .067
MODELS 5-B
Christian 2.147 .148*** 2.225 .170*** 1.594 .155*** 1.627 .137***
  × (Former) Communist .271 .652 1.519 .925 1.672 .514** 1.270 .717
  × GRI .046 .086 .189 .083* .055 .076 –.071 .080
  × (Former) Communist × GRI –.082 .123 –.289 .167 –.100 .111 .017 .138
Muslim 2.024 .156*** 2.576 .197*** 2.105 .143*** 2.003 .153***
  × (Former) Communist –.713 .474 .863 .944 1.573 .448*** .558 .940
  × GRI –.014 .084 .172 .086* .107 .054 –.018 .065
  × (Former) Communist × GRI .029 .098 –.280 .175 –.191 .084* .031 .167
Other Religion 1.873 .157*** 2.039 .199*** 1.235 .109*** 1.638 .134***
  × (Former) Communist –.009 .475 3.917 .914*** 2.042 .250*** 2.766 .544***
  × GRI –.019 .067 .091 .084 .060 .053 –.049 .069
  × (Former) Communist × GRI –.126 .094 –.584 .176** –.142 .062* –.184 .107
All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, proportion unaffiliated, and GDP; Models 5-A also include 
religious tradition dummies; Models 5-B also include main effects for communism, GRI, and communism × GRI, and 
interactions between religious tradition dummies and both proportion unaffiliated and GDP; Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 
N = 52.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
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counterintuitive as the negative effect of communism on religiosity is 
thought to be a result of communist states’ regulation of religion. More 
to the point of the article, the three-way interactions in the model of 
belief in God (Model 5-B) show significant, negative interactions be-
tween GRI, communism, and both Muslim and other religion. These 
interactions indicate that while Muslims and affiliates of other reli-
gions in communist nations are especially more likely than the unaf-
filiated to believe in God (interactions between affiliations and com-
munism are positive), such differences in belief in God are reduced in 
higher GRI nations. The same pattern applies to differences in prayer 
between affiliates of other religions and the unaffiliated. These results 
are also somewhat counterintuitive as they suggest that high levels of 
religious regulation mitigate rather than exacerbate the influence of 
living in a communist or post-communist nation on differences in re-
ligiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated; though, as Grim and 
Finke (2006) note, religious regulation generally pertains to favoring 
one religion over others, not favoring irreligion over religion. 
The potential problem with measuring religious regulation along 
a single dimension leads to the second alternate analysis. The influ-
ence of religious regulation may differ in nations that regulate reli-
gion by supporting one religion over others and nations that regulate 
religion by suppressing all religions. Thus, I replace the GRI measure 
with two dummy variables: one for nations that have established re-
ligions or favor one religion over others, and one for nations that are 
hostile toward religion (see Pew Research Center, 2017). Having no 
state religion but also not being hostile toward religion is the largest 
category and serves as the omitted reference category. Models of no 
religious affiliation reveal that having an established or favored re-
ligion has a negative effect on nonaffiliation, but the establishment/
favored religion and hostile toward religion variables do not interact 
significantly with the demographic variables used to predict non-af-
filiation (not shown). 
As Table 6 shows, when it comes to models of religiosity, there are 
notable interactions between religious affiliations and both establish-
ment/favored religion and hostility toward religion (Models 6-B). This 
is clearest in the models of belief in God and considering one’s self re-
ligious. For instance, living in a nation with an established/favored re-
ligion increases differences in belief in God between the unaffiliated 
and Christians (b = 1.354), Muslims (b = 1.110), and affiliates of other 
P h i l i p  S c h wa d e l  i n  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  R e s e a r c h  70  ( 2 0 1 8 )       27
religions (b = .931). At the same time, living in a nation that is hostile 
toward religion also increases differences in belief in God between the 
unaffiliated and both Muslims (b = 1.221) and affiliates of other reli-
gions (b = 1.012). In other words, differences in belief in God between 
the affiliated and unaffiliated are smallest in nations with no state reli-
gion (the omitted reference category). These results point to the ways 
that any restriction on religion—either in support of or opposed to re-
ligion—can exacerbate differences in religiosity between the affiliated 
and unaffiliated. Looking at the models in Table 6 as a whole though 
shows that establishment/favoring religion more consistently inten-
sifies differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated. 
In contrast to Hypothesis 5, these results suggest that religious regu-
lation is associated with an increase, not a decrease, in differences in 
religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated. 
The third and final alternate analysis explores the effects of na-
tional religious composition in more detail. Instead of examining how 
the effects of religious affiliation on measures of religiosity vary by 
Table 6. Focal fixed effects results from multilevel models of religiosity with measures of state 
support for and hostility toward religion.
                                                     Service Attendance       Frequency of Prayer          Believe in Goda          Consider Self Religiousa
 b  se b se b se b se
MODELS 6-A
State Hostile toward Religionb –.410 .113*** –.448 .159** .041 .308 −1.021 .399*
Established/Favored Religionb –.221 .084* –.079 .116 –.300 .233 –.272 .216
MODELS 6-B
Christian .986 .059*** .801 .061*** 1.631 .122*** 1.709 .115***
  × State Hostile toward Religionb –.194 .193 –.310 .211 .554 .368 –.156 .524
  × Established/Favored Religionb .005 .125 .199 .132 1.354 .299*** .596 .272*
Muslim .952 .064*** .952 .067*** 2.347 .125*** 2.095 .129***
  × State Hostile toward Religionb .074 .179 .150 .258 1.221 .474* .374 .573
  × Established/Favored Religionb .232 .150 .507 .171** 1.110 .312*** 1.062 .305***
Other Religion .890 .063*** .739 .073*** 1.227 .099*** 1.649 .132***
  × State Hostile toward Religionb  –.287 .211 –.794 .407 1.012 .397* –.152 .601
  × Established/Favored Religionb .429 .180* .363 .184 .931 .251*** .412 .386
All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, proportion unaffiliated, GDP, and communism; Models 6-A also 
include religious tradition dummies; Models 6-B also include main effects for state hostile toward religion and established/
favored religion, and interactions between religious tradition dummies and proportion unaffiliated, GDP, and communism; 
Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
b. No state religion is omitted reference category.
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the prevalence of non-affiliation in the nation (see Table 4), the mod-
els of religiosity reported in Table 7 measure the religious context 
with proportion Christian, Muslim, and other religion. This provides 
a different picture, potentially showing how the size of different reli-
gious groups influences the results, and how the effects of specific re-
ligious traditions are related to their prevalence in each nation. Look-
ing across the models with interaction effects in Table 7 (Models 7-B), 
it is proportion Muslim that most consistently interacts with each re-
ligious tradition. The positive effects of both Christian and Muslim on 
all four measures of religiosity decline as the proportion Muslim in-
creases. Conversely, proportion Christian only moderates the effects 
of Christian and Muslim on believe in God, and the effect of Muslim 
on considering one’s self religious; and proportion other religion plays 
no moderating role. These findings suggest that the support for Hy-
pothesis 6 noted above—greater differences in religiosity between the 
Table 7. Focal fixed effects results from multilevel models of religiosity with proportion Christian, 
Muslim, and other religion.
                                           Service Attendance         Frequency of Prayer           Believe in Goda          Consider Self Religiousa
 b se b se b se b se
MODELS 7-A
Proportion Christian .107 .251 .240 .202 1.305 .363*** .671 .427
Proportion Muslim –.195 .233 –.003 .200 1.483 .341*** –.485 .484
Proportion Other Religion –.118 .309 .150 .275 −1.140 .615 −1.370 .569*
MODELS 7-B
Christian .932 .063*** .750 .062*** 1.594 .132*** 1.642 .119***
  × Proportion Christian –.093 .327 –.389 .348 −1.643 .583** −1.366 .772
  × Proportion Muslim –.856 .321* −1.169 .344*** −1.729 .601** −2.918 .818***
  × Proportion Other Religion .050 .493 .273 .490 −1.248 1.476 −1.941 1.005
Muslim .904 .072*** .900 .073*** 2.449 .122*** 2.012 .140***
  × Proportion Christian –.666 .467 –.704 .453 −4.107 .728*** −2.031 .964*
  × Proportion Muslim −1.388 .427** −1.085 .454* −2.078 .628** −2.776 .886**
  × Proportion Other Religion –.615 .490 –.055 .556 −1.685 1.308 –.864 1.124
Other Religion .825 .073*** .684 .090*** 1.637 .120*** 1.568 .147***
  × Proportion Christian –.020 .321 .405 .357 −1.041 .540 –.515 .680
  × Proportion Muslim –.550 .300 –.144 .482 .510 .567 −1.699 .792*
  × Proportion Other Religion –.235 .443 .802 .552 −1.225 .750 .150 .885
All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, GRI, communism, and GDP; Models 7-A also include religious 
tradition dummies; Models 7-B also include interactions between religious tradition dummies and communism, GRI, and 
GDP; Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
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affiliated and unaffiliated in nations with a high proportion of unaf-
filiated—is disproportionately due to the lack of a Muslim presence 
in those nations. 
3. Discussion and conclusions 
A growing body of research examines the individual attributes that 
predict religious non-affiliation (e.g. Baker and Smith, 2009; Baker 
and Whitehead, 2016; Schwadel, 2014) and the religious consequences 
of non-affiliation (e.g. Kosmin et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2010). This re-
search, however, is predominantly limited to the US and a few other, 
primarily Western nations. Social scientific understanding of the so-
cial origins and religious repercussions of non-affiliation is therefore 
similarly limited to those nations. As discussed above, the social and 
cultural implications of demographic characteristics vary across na-
tions (Ayalon et al., 2014; Cooke and Baxter, 2010; Inglehart and Nor-
ris, 2003; Schwadel, 2015), which suggests that the effects of such 
characteristics on the likelihood of non-affiliation vary across nations 
(Hayes, 2000). The cultural implications of religious non-affiliation 
also differ from nation to nation (Ribberink et al., 2013; Wohlrab-Sahr 
and Burchardt, 2012), which suggests distinct religious consequences 
of being unaffiliated. This article expands on previous research by ex-
amining cross-national variation in the causes and consequences of 
religious non-affiliation. 
The above results show large demographic differences in the likeli-
hood of non-affiliation. On average, men are more likely than women, 
non-married are more likely than married, and young adults are more 
likely than the elderly to have no religious affiliation, but the extent 
and even existence of these differences varies from nation to nation. 
This comports with Hayes (2000) analysis of variation in the factors 
predicting non-affiliation across 10 Western, Christian nations. Going 
beyond Hayes’ analysis, the results here suggest that demographic dif-
ferences in the likelihood of non-affiliation are most pronounced in na-
tions with low levels of religious regulation, which supports Hypoth-
esis 2. As some researchers argue (e.g. Stark and Finke, 2000; Miller 
and Stark, 2002), greater aversion to risk among women and older 
adults may produce age and gender differences in religiosity. In na-
tions with restrictive regulations on religion, however, risk-avoidance 
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in relation to religion may instead be more evenly distributed across 
the population. While a high level of religious regulation can reflect 
the suppression of religion in general, it more often reflects the sup-
pression of some religions and the establishment or semi-establish-
ment of others (Grim and Finke, 2006).5 Consequently, high levels of 
religious regulation are associated with lower levels of non-affilia-
tion, and fewer differences by age, gender, and marital status as the 
potential consequences of non-affiliation are more severe in many of 
those nations. As research on conformity suggests (e.g. Blanton and 
Hall, 2009), sanctions and regulations lead to less deviation from es-
tablished norms. 
In contrast to the first hypothesis, higher GDP is associated with 
increased differences in non-affiliation between older and younger 
adults. While this finding was unexpected, it may be explained by the 
persistence of life-course effects and the potential impact of genera-
tions. Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) influential secularization theory 
proposes that material prosperity promotes an existential security that 
diminishes the need for religion. The above results add to research in 
this area by suggesting that the impact of economic development on 
religious non-affiliation is disproportionately found among younger 
adults. Perhaps the emphasis on religion among the elderly is a univer-
sal phenomenon, regardless of the level of existential security. Alter-
natively, age effects can instead reflect differences across birth cohorts 
because the above analysis uses cross-sectional data. Consequently, 
it may be that nonaffiliation is particularly common among more re-
cent generations in highly developed nations, which would fit with a 
secularization perspective (e.g. Barro and McCleary, 2003). Overall, 
these results reflect, and further knowledge of, the culturally-specific 
social implications of socially constructed identities such as age, gen-
der, and marital status (Jenkins, 2008). 
Turning to the religious consequences of non-affiliation, the results 
show considerable variation across nations in the religious activities 
and beliefs of the unaffiliated. Differences in religiosity between the 
unaffiliated and religious affiliates are largest in nations with high 
proportions of unaffiliated, which supports the sixth hypothesis. This 
5 For instance, in the analytic sample employed here, the nation with the highest GRI score 
is a relatively secular, communist state. Those with the next two highest GRI scores are 
more than 90% Muslim, but only one establishes Islam as the state religion (Pew Re-
search Center, 2017). 
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is predominantly because non-affiliates’ religiosity— particularly their 
frequency of prayer, belief in God, and likelihood of considering them-
selves religious—is far lower in nations where there are large numbers 
of unaffiliated, but the religiosity of religious affiliates is less affected 
by variation in the proportion unaffiliated. In regards to secularization 
debates and concerns that religious non-affiliation is a key sign of re-
ligious decline (e.g. Marwell and Demerath, 2003), this suggests that 
the secularizing impact of non-affiliation is contingent on non-affilia-
tion attaining a widespread presence in the population. Religious non-
affiliation is a social innovation (Tamney et al., 1989), which, while 
highly prevalent in some nations, is all but absent in others (Hackett 
et al., 2012; Hackett and Huynh, 2015). Just as religious homogeneity 
is said to provide a “sacred canopy” for believers by staving off prob-
lems of plausibility (Berger, 1967), a large enough presence of non-
affiliates may provide an “unsacred canopy,” for lack of a better term, 
that can strengthen the plausibility structures associated with a sec-
ular worldview. 
Differences in religiosity between the religiously affiliated and un-
affiliated also vary between non-communist and communist/ former 
communist nations. Communism is associated with particularly low 
levels of religiosity among the unaffiliated, more so than among reli-
gious affiliates. Consequently, differences in religiosity between the 
affiliated and unaffiliated are especially large in communist and for-
merly communist nations, which supports the seventh hypothesis. 
Similar to nations with large unaffiliated populations, the social ac-
ceptance of secularity in communist and formerly communist nations 
(Barber, 2011; Barro and McCleary, 2003) can provide a status shield 
(Hochschild, 1983) for those with more secular worldviews. In other 
words, it may be easier for the unaffiliated to be less religious both 
in communist/former communist nations and in nations with large 
numbers of religious nonaffiliates due to reduced pressure to be reli-
gious in those contexts. 
The final noteworthy finding from the primary analysis is the mod-
erating impact of economic development on the association between 
non-affiliation and belief in God. Belief in God declines as GDP in-
creases, but much more so for the unaffiliated than for those with a 
religious affiliation. Differences in belief in God between the affiliated 
and unaffiliated are therefore especially large in nations with high per 
capita GDP, which provides some support for the fourth hypothesis. 
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These results suggest that the diminished need for religion in prosper-
ous nations with low levels of existential insecurity (Norris and Ingle-
hart, 2004) varies across religious affiliations. Indeed, Muslims’ belief 
in God is relatively unaffected by GDP while belief in God among the 
unaffiliated declines dramatically as GDP increases. Perhaps existen-
tial security is not so much a nation-level phenomenon but is instead 
more strongly tied to the local context. The social world inhabited by 
a Muslim in a high-GDP nation may be wrought with existential in-
securities while that inhabited by a non-affiliate in the same nation 
may be quite different. Future research can expand on these findings 
by focusing on smaller social contexts, such as regions, cities, neigh-
borhoods, or even the social networks that structure social relations 
on a daily basis. 
The ancillary models add valuable nuance to the findings. For in-
stance, the interactions between religious regulation and communism 
suggest that the relatively robust differences in religiosity between 
the affiliated and unaffiliated in communist/post-communist nations 
is not due to higher levels of religious regulation in those nations.6 In 
other words, communism appears to exacerbate differences in religi-
osity—particularly belief in God and considering one’s self religious—
between the affiliated and unaffiliated for reasons unrelated to how 
the government treats religion. As I discuss below, a focus on the social 
as opposed to legal acceptance of religion and secularity may provide 
6 Additional models combined the approaches in Table 5 and 6 to examine how the effects of 
communism vary by state hostility toward religion. Recall that the primary interactions 
with communism and religious affiliations were in the models of belief in God and con-
sidering one’s self religious (Table 4). I ran identical models but replaced the communism 
measure with two dummy variables: Communist nation that is not hostile toward reli-
gion and communist nation that is hostile toward religion. Results from the model of be-
lief in God show significant, positive interactions between Christianity and both commu-
nist nations hostile toward religion (b = 1.387) and communist nations that are not hostile 
toward religion (b = .833), between Muslim and communist nations that are hostile to-
ward religion (b = 1.223), and between other religion and both communist nations hos-
tile toward religion (b = 2.045) and communist nations that are not hostile toward reli-
gion (b = 1.034). Results from the model of considering one’s self religious show positive 
interactions between Christianity and both communist nations hostile toward religion (b 
= .934) and communist nations that are not hostile toward religion (b = 1.089), and be-
tween other religion and both communist nations hostile toward religion (b = 1.324) and 
communist nations that are not hostile toward religion (b = 1.476). Similar to the results 
in Table 5, these results also suggest that that the relatively robust differences in religios-
ity between the affiliated and unaffiliated in communist/post-communist nations is not 
due to state-level hostility toward religion in such nations.   
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greater insight into the impact of living in communist/post-commu-
nist nations. Another interesting finding from the ancillary models is 
the relative similarity in belief in God between the affiliated and un-
affiliated in nations with neither an established/favored religion nor 
state hostility toward religion. This contributes to the supply-side per-
spective (e.g. Stark and Finke, 2000) by pointing to the potentially 
higher levels of religiosity among the unaffiliated when there is a free 
religious marketplace. Lastly, the ancillary models indicate that the 
relatively large differences in religiosity between the affiliated and 
unaffiliated in nations with high proportions of unaffiliated are dis-
proportionately due to the small number of Muslims in such nations. 
This suggests that individual-level variation in religiosity may be sup-
pressed in Muslim-majority nations in particular.  
There are, of course, other important limitations to the analyses re-
ported here. The WVS includes four broadly-applicable measures of re-
ligiosity in the form of service attendance, frequency of prayer, belief 
in God, and considering one’s self religious. Still, given the compara-
tive nature of the research, other indicators may be more relevant for 
certain religious groups, such as the importance of ancestors in some 
Asian religions. The cross-sectional nature of the data is another re-
striction, which limits the causal conclusions that can be drawn from 
the analysis. It is entirely possible, for example, for someone to with-
draw from religious activities, then decline in their belief, and then 
eventually disaffiliate from religion. Future research can expand on 
this article by employing cross-national, longitudinal data, though 
such data are rare. Additional nation-level measures may also fur-
ther understanding of the demographic origins and religious conse-
quences of apostasy. For instance, I focused on a single measure of 
government regulation of religion (GRI) while the social acceptance 
of religion is related to but not equivalent to such government regu-
lation (Grim and Finke, 2006). 
Religious non-affiliation is a worldwide phenomenon that is trans-
forming understanding of human societies. Those with no religion 
now constitute the world’s third largest religious group, and the sec-
ond largest group in almost half of all nations (Hackett and Huynh, 
2015). This article makes clear that who is unaffiliated and the reli-
gious consequences of such non-affiliation vary across nations. Tay-
lor’s (2007) work on secularity is particularly relevant here as he 
describes the cultural transformation that led to the contemporary 
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context where secularity is a viable option. But this “secular age” is 
not uniformly distributed around the world. It is more socially accept-
able to be less religious or even irreligious in some nations than in 
others. Moreover, the negative effect of secular contexts on individu-
als’ religious beliefs and behaviors is most robust for the unaffiliated. 
Not all apostates live in social contexts that allow for the easy secular 
choices Taylor describes. Instead, non-affiliates who live in nations 
with many other non-affiliates, communist/formerly communist na-
tions, and high per capita GDP nations appear more amenable to (or 
able to) choose secularity.  
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